The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered cross-motions for summary judgment. It granted the defendants’ motion, holding that the copyright infringement claim was time-barred because the plaintiff, given his immersion in Italian culture and proximity to the events, should have discovered the alleged infringement well before 2019. The court further ruled that, because the copyright claim was untimely, the related Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) claim and a request for reconsideration of the damages period were moot.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the copyright infringement claim was time-barred under the discovery rule, as a reasonably diligent copyright holder in the plaintiff’s position would have discovered the alleged infringement more than three years before filing suit. The appellate court also declined to consider the plaintiff’s argument regarding the independent accrual of the DMCA claim, as it was neither properly preserved nor adequately presented on appeal. View “Hayden v. Koons” on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Federal Claims reviewed the case after 4DD filed suit for copyright infringement. During discovery, evidence destruction by the government led to sanctions. Following a bench trial, the court found the government had significantly exceeded its licenses and assessed damages using a hypothetical negotiation approach, considering factors like the existence of alternative software and the nature of the use, instead of defaulting to the rates in the licensing agreements. The court awarded $12,683,065.86 in damages, including compensatory and non-compensatory (statutory) damages.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit examined whether damages should be calculated by reference to the license rates or through a hypothetical negotiation. The court held that neither statute nor precedent compels using the license agreement rates for damages; courts may use hypothetical negotiations when material differences exist between licensed and infringing uses. However, the trial court erred by considering unforeseeable future events (like TETRA’s cancellation) in its damages analysis and by awarding non-compensatory statutory damages against the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View “4DD HOLDINGS, LLC v. US ” on Justia Law

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The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially issued a preliminary injunction against the Dutch company, finding the American company was likely to succeed on its copyright, trademark, trade secret, and tortious interference claims. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. altered the standard for the extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, the district court modified its injunction to comply with the new “conduct-focused” approach and dismissed the copyright claim. The district court also ordered the Dutch company to correct statements made to the Dutch court and later held the company in civil contempt for failing to comply fully, imposing a monetary sanction.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying the Supreme Court’s new guidance from Abitron, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the second amended preliminary injunction, holding that the Dutch company’s conduct constituted infringing use in U.S. commerce under the Lanham Act, and that the Defend Trade Secrets Act’s express extraterritorial provision was satisfied by acts in furtherance of misappropriation occurring in the United States. The court dismissed the appeals from the correction and contempt orders for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View “Dmarcian, Inc. v. DMARC Advisor BV” on Justia Law

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The Dutch court initially denied the plaintiff’s request to stay the Dutch proceedings, partly relying on representations from the defendant’s counsel. The plaintiff returned to the North Carolina court, seeking an order requiring the defendant to correct these alleged misrepresentations in the Dutch court. The district court ordered the defendant to submit both its order and a corrective statement to the Dutch court. The defendant submitted the order but did not file the separate corrective statement. Later, the Dutch court stayed its proceedings. The plaintiff then moved for contempt sanctions in the North Carolina court against the defendant and its attorneys for failing to comply fully with the correction order. Following a show cause hearing, the district court held the defendant and Millen in civil contempt, sanctioning Millen by suspending his ability to practice in the district, though not holding him jointly liable for monetary sanctions.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review the contempt order against Millen, a nonparty. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing civil contempt sanctions on Millen without clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff was harmed by Millen’s failure to submit the separate statement. The court vacated the civil contempt adjudication and sanction against Millen. View “Dmarcian, Inc. v. Millen” on Justia Law

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Following extensive procedural history, including several prior appeals and a Supreme Court decision clarifying when copyright owners may sue, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed the plaintiff’s earlier complaint without prejudice due to the timing of his copyright registration. The plaintiff then filed a new action, again asserting copyright infringement. The defendant responded with counterclaims challenging the validity of the plaintiff’s copyright registration and moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had assigned his copyright to Sony by agreeing to the contest’s rules. The district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation granting summary judgment to the defendant, dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims, and invalidated the plaintiff’s copyright registration, all without permitting discovery.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment and invalidating the copyright registration without affording the plaintiff a fair opportunity to conduct discovery, particularly since the relevant evidence was largely under the defendant’s and Sony’s control. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment order and the invalidation of the copyright registration, remanding the case for further proceedings to allow discovery. View “Cortes-Ramos v. Martin-Morales” on Justia Law

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Deque filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming copyright infringement, false advertising, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, and sought injunctive relief, damages, and other remedies. During discovery, Deque repeatedly failed to properly disclose its damages calculations and supporting evidence by the deadlines set in the court’s scheduling order. Despite several opportunities to supplement its disclosures and a late attempt to introduce expert testimony, Deque did not timely provide the required information. BrowserStack moved to exclude Deque’s damages evidence and for summary judgment. The district court granted these motions, finding that Deque’s noncompliance with disclosure rules was neither substantially justified nor harmless, and that Deque presented no evidence supporting injunctive or other relief.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence of Deque’s damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to repeated and unjustified failures to comply with disclosure requirements. The court also held that summary judgment for BrowserStack was warranted because Deque could not establish entitlement to injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief. View “Deque Systems Inc. v. Browserstack, Inc.” on Justia Law

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The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially concluded that Ross’s termination interests did not enter his bankruptcy estate, interpreting the Copyright Act and Bankruptcy Code to exclude them. The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the effectiveness of the termination notice, and the case proceeded to trial. After the jury’s factual findings, the district court concluded the termination notice was valid. Lil’ Joe Records appealed the district court’s final judgment, the denial of its motion for summary judgment, and the denial of its motion for reconsideration.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Ross’s termination interests were property of his bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding the Copyright Act’s inalienability restriction. Because these interests were never scheduled or administered by the bankruptcy court, they remained with the bankruptcy estate when Ross attempted to exercise them. As a result, Ross could not validly sign the termination notice, and the group did not have the required majority to terminate the copyright grants. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View “Lil’ Joe Records, Inc. v. Won” on Justia Law

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After Worrell’s estate sued Thang and Clinton in New York state court for breach of contract related to the 1976 Agreement, the New York Supreme Court dismissed the suit. The court found that the agreement was not enforceable because it had not been signed by Thang, and the estate did not refute this. Subsequently, the estate filed a new action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking a declaration of joint copyright ownership in the sound recordings and an accounting of royalties. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on statute of limitations grounds, holding that the estate’s copyright claims were untimely.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The court held that, given the unique circumstances—including the parties’ decades-long conduct in apparent reliance on the 1976 Agreement—there was a factual question as to whether Clinton and Thang had “plainly and expressly repudiated” Worrell’s copyright co-ownership before 2020. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that part of the estate’s copyright-ownership claim is timely. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact as to Worrell’s status as a co-author of the recordings. View “Estate of Worrell v. Thang, Inc.” on Justia Law

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In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the defendants argued that the agency lacked statutory standing under the Copyright Act because it was not the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under the copyright. The district court agreed, finding that the photographer’s retention of certain rights in the agreement meant the agency did not have an exclusive license, and therefore lacked standing. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It also denied the agency’s late motion to amend the complaint to add the photographer as a co-plaintiff.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court’s analysis was mistaken: the reservation of certain rights by the photographer did not automatically eliminate the agency’s ability to hold other exclusive rights. The appellate court vacated the summary judgment, affirmed the denial of the motion to amend, and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to reconsider the standing issue and the effect of the authorization letter in light of its opinion. View “Great Bowery Inc. v. Consequence Sound LLC” on Justia Law

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The videographer sued the media company for copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendant, finding that the use of the Jordan Video was fair use, the screenshots were de minimis and not actionable, and the embedding of the Melle Mel Video was permitted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court found that the district court erred in determining, at the pleading stage, that the media company’s use of the entire Jordan Video was fair use, since it could substitute for the original and potentially harm the market for the video. The appellate court also found that the screenshots’ use was not de minimis because they were clearly recognizable and prominently displayed. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that embedding the Melle Mel Video from YouTube was permitted by the license granted under YouTube’s Terms of Service.

The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment as to the Jordan Video and both sets of screenshots, affirmed as to the Melle Mel Video, and remanded for further proceedings. View “Richardson v. Townsquare Media, Inc.” on Justia Law

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