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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARKETING INFORMATION
MASTERS, INC., a California
corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY
SYSTEM, et. al.,

Defendants.

Civil No. 06cv1682 JAH (JMA)

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS [Doc. No. 12]**

On November 20, 2006, Defendant Board of Trustees of California State University (“Board of Trustees”) and Defendant Robert A. Rauch (collectively “Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Marketing Information Masters, Inc. (“MIM”) filed an opposition on January 4, 2007. Defendants filed a reply on January 10, 2007. After a thorough review of the parties’ submissions, the Court **GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART** Defendant’s motion.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a California corporation in the business of performing marketing research studies, filed a complaint on August 18, 2006, and an amended complaint (“FAC”) on November 8, 2006, alleging copyright infringement, conversion, misappropriation and unfair business practices. The Board of Trustees and Robert A. Rauch, an affiliate with the San Diego State University Center for Hospitality and Tourism Research (“the Center”), were named as defendants. Plaintiff alleges it performed studies of the economic impact of the Holiday Bowl

1 on the San Diego community which it recorded in written reports protected under copyright
2 laws and provided to the Holiday Bowl organization at fees below market rate. FAC ¶ 4 at 2.
3 Plaintiff prepared a report of the impact of the 2003 Holiday Bowl and provided the report
4 to the Holiday Bowl Committee in February 2004. Id. ¶ 6 at 2. After delivering the report,
5 Michael Casinelli, owner of Marketing Information Masters, notified the organization it would
6 need to pay market rates for any additional impact studies. Id. ¶ 7 at 2. Thereafter, the
7 Holiday Bowl organization contracted with the Center to conduct the impact study for the
8 2004 Holiday Bowl. Id. ¶ 8 at 2 -3. Plaintiff alleges the Center copied and plagiarized
9 Plaintiff's 2003 report to prepare the 2004 report. Id. ¶ 10 at 3.

10 **DISCUSSION**

11 Defendants maintain they are entitled to sovereign immunity and seek dismissal of the
12 action in its entirety and further argue the state law claims are preempted by the Federal
13 Copyright Act. Plaintiff opposes Defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that state
14 sovereign immunity is abrogated by the Copyright Clarification Act, Defendant Rauch is not
15 entitled to state sovereign immunity, and Plaintiff's state law claims are not preempted by
16 federal law.

17 **I. Legal Standard**

18 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency
19 of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal of a claim
20 under this rule is appropriate only where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
21 no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson,
22 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732. Dismissal is warranted under Rule
23 12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter
24 Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326
25 (1989) ("Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue
26 of law."). Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal
27 theory yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534.

28 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must assume the truth

1 of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light most favorable
2 to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); Cahill v.
3 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal conclusions need
4 not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Iieto v.
5 Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d
6 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider the
7 facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon
8 but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of which
9 the Court takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-706 (9th Cir. 1998);
10 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).

11 II. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

12 A. Copyright Infringement Claim

13 Defendants maintain the copyright claim must be dismissed, because they are entitled
14 to Eleventh Amendment Immunity.

15 1. Legal Standard

16 The Eleventh Amendment provides a state immunity from suit unless the state consents
17 to be sued or Congress validly overrides the state's immunity. See Green v. Mansour, 474
18 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). In order to determine whether a state's immunity has been validly
19 overridden by Congress, the court looks to two factors: (1) whether Congress expressed a clear
20 intent to override the state's immunity and (2) whether Congress acted pursuant to a
21 constitutional grant of authority. See Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991);
22 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (citations omitted). Congress
23 may not validly abrogate State immunity under Article I of the Constitution. See id.
24 However, Congress does have the ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the
25 enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
26 456 (1976); Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637 (1999). Under §5 of
27 the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power of enforcement but not the power to
28 deem an action a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court outlined a test for determining

1 whether an act constitutes a valid exercise of Congress's powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth
2 Amendment in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), known as the "congruence and
3 proportionality" test. The test was further clarified in Florida Prepaid. In order "to invoke §5,
4 [Congress] must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
5 provisions, and it must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct."
6 Florida Prepaid, 527 at 639.

7 2. Analysis

8 The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act ("CRCA") was passed with the intent to
9 subject states to liability for copyright infringement. The Copyright Clarification Act, Hearing
10 before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Pla's Exh. A at 8 (Doc. No.
11 13). Pursuant to the CRCA, the Copyright Act was modified to state:

12 Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of
13 a State or instrumentality of a State ...shall not be immune, under the
14 Eleventh Amendment ...from suit in Federal Court...for a violation of any
15 of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner ...
16 17 U.S.C.A. section 511(a) (1994).

17 Defendants contend the CRCA was not passed pursuant to a constitutional grant of
18 power, and therefore does not validly provide a waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity.
19 Specifically, Defendants argue the CRCA was improperly passed by Congress based upon
20 Article I of the Constitution. Furthermore, Defendants argue the CRCA fails as a Fourteenth
21 Amendment enactment because Congress did not identify a pattern of copyright infringement
22 by states, Congress did not limit the scope of the CRCA, and Congress did not consider
23 alternative methods through which copyright holders may obtain relief.

24 Plaintiff argues that the CRCA is a valid abrogation of the state's sovereign immunity,
25 because it was enacted pursuant to Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth
26 Amendment.

27 Neither the Supreme Court, nor the Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue of whether
28 the CRCA is a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity. However, the Supreme Court
struck down as unconstitutional two similar "remedy clarification" acts involving intellectual
property rights; the Patent and Plant Remedy Clarification Act and the Trademark Remedy

1 Clarification Act. See Florida Prepaid 527 at 627; College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
2 Postsecondary Education Expense Fund, 527 U.S. 666 (1999). In Florida Prepaid, the
3 Supreme Court found Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the states and
4 barely considered availability of state remedies thus failing to support “the proposition that
5 Congress sought to remedy a Fourteenth Amendment violation in enacting the Patent Remedy
6 Act.” 527 U.S. at 642-47. The Court in College Savings Bank, found the right to be free from
7 a business competitor’s false advertising and the right to be secure in one’s business interests
8 did not qualify as property rights protected by the due process clause, and therefore the
9 Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, which was enacted to remedy those deprivations, was
10 not a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 527 U.S. at 672-75.

11 The Fifth Circuit, the only circuit court addressing the issue, has held that the CRCA
12 is not a proper exercise of Congress’ power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
13 therefore is not a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Chavez v. Arte Publico Press,
14 204 F.3d 601,608 (5th Cir. 2000). Applying the analytical framework of Florida Prepaid, the
15 court found that Congress, in its enactment of the CRCA, failed to uncover a pattern of
16 constitutional violations by states regarding infringement of the copyright act, failed to
17 consider alternative methods of obtaining relief, and failed to limit the reach of the CRCA in
18 any manner. Id. at 605 - 608.

19 This Court agrees that the CRCA does not constitute a valid abrogation of state
20 sovereign immunity. Based upon the clear language of the CRCA, this Court finds Congress
21 intended to abrogate States’ immunity through its enactment. The CRCA specifically states
22 Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply in cases of copyright infringement. See 17
23 U.S.C. § 511(a). However, this Court finds the CRCA was not passed pursuant to a valid
24 exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers.

25 According to the Fifth Circuit in Chavez, the relevant inquiry for determining whether
26 the CRCA constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment powers is:
27 (1) whether there is a pattern of copyright infringement by states; (2) whether adequate state
28 remedies for copyright infringement exist; and (3) the coverage of the legislation. Chavez, 204

1 F.3d at 605 (citing Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 - 645. This Court concurs with the Fifth
2 Circuit's application of the analytical framework presented in Florida Prepaid to the CRCA.
3 In its enactment of the CRCA, Congress considered several factors, including incidents of past
4 infringement by states as well as anticipation of future infringement by states. Hearing
5 Documents for the CRCA, Pla's Exh A-C (Doc. No. 13). Anecdotal evidence was considered
6 along with eight recent cases involving state infringement of copyrights. See id.; Pla's Exh. A
7 at 17. Witnesses also provided examples of states refusing to negotiate over licenses,
8 photocopying copyrighted material, and copying parts of books where permission from the
9 copyright owner was denied. Pla's Exh. A at 23, 27; Exh. B at 29. The testimony and
10 evidence demonstrated at most sporadic violations, not widespread violations by states.
11 Furthermore, the committee notes there was no evidence of "any significant number of
12 wholesale takings of copyright rights by States and State entities." Kastenmeier Testimony,
13 Pla's Exh. B at 6. Additionally, Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights, reported during his
14 testimony that states are "respectful of the copyright law" and he believes they will remain so.
15 Pla's Exh. A at 8. As noted by the Fifth Circuit in Chavez, the reports and testimony do not
16 demonstrate a pattern of unremedied copyright infringement by states. 204 F.3d at 606.
17 Instead, the testimony describes the potential for violations by states if they were not held
18 accountable for copyright infringement. As such, there is no evidence of a pattern of copyright
19 infringement by the states.

20 Additionally, the evidence demonstrates the committee minimally considered adequacy
21 of state remedies. There are references in the testimony to the exclusivity of jurisdiction over
22 copyright actions in Federal court. See e.g. Oman Statement, Exh. A at 7.; Exh. A at 18, 26;
23 Exh. B at 9; Comments of National Music Publisher's Association, Inc. Exh. C (Part 1) at 34;
24 Exh. C (Part 2) at 2. However, the discussion regarding available remedies focuses primarily
25 on the inadequacy of injunctive relief. There is minimal discussion of waivers by the state and,
26 as noted by the Fifth Circuit, no discussion of other state remedies such as breach of contract
27 claims.

28 Finally, the coverage of the CRCA is not sufficiently narrow to address conduct that

1 violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court in Florida
2 Prepaid noted that a state's negligent act does not violate the due process clause and the
3 legislative history of the Patent Remedy Act suggested Congress enacted the legislation "in
4 response to a handful of instances of patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the
5 Constitution." 527 U.S. at 645-56. The Court found the provisions of the Act, which did not
6 require any showing of intent to infringe, were not sufficiently tailored to remedy
7 unconstitutional behavior. Id. at 646. The discussion in Florida Prepaid teaches "that a
8 deprivation, to fit the meaning of the due process clause, must be intentional.. ." Chavez, 204
9 F.3d at 607. Like patent infringement, copyright infringement does not require a showing of
10 intent. See Florida Prepaid 527 U.S. at 645; Chavez, 204 F.3d at 607. Congress failed to
11 limit the reach of the CRCA to infringement which violates the due process clause of the
12 Fourteenth Amendment. As such, the CRCA is not proportionate to ends legitimate under §
13 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

14 This Court finds the CRCA fails to meet the "congruence and proportionality" test and
15 is not a valid exercise of Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
16 Accordingly, Defendant Board of Trustees and Robert A. Rauch, in his official capacity, are
17 entitled to immunity.

18 3. Individual Capacity Suit Against Defendant Rauch

19 a. Legal Standard

20 State sovereign immunity extends to government officials that are sued for damages in
21 their official capacity. Cary v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
22 (1974). An individual capacity suit against a government official is one that directly attaches
23 that individual's assets and is one that will not lead to monetary liability of the state.
24 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 168 (1985). The deciding factor for ascertaining whether
25 a suit is an official capacity suit or an individual capacity suit is not how the suit is labeled by
26 the plaintiff, but rather the nature of the suit. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
27 337 U.S. 682, 714 (1948). Where the suit is in fact against the individual, the individual is
28 not automatically immune from suit by virtue of the fact that the act was undertaken in the

1 course of his or her employment. Id. Based on this finding, the Fourth Circuit has held that
2 a public relations director of a state university director may be held liable for committing
3 copyright infringement in the course of her employment. See Richard Anderson Photography
4 v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988).

5 **b. Analysis**

6 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rauch and the Center copied and plagiarized Plaintiff's
7 survey without permission. FAC ¶ 10 at 3. At the time of the alleged copyright infringement,
8 Defendant Rauch was the acting director of the Center and oversaw the preparation of the
9 2004 study and report. Id. ¶ 9 at 3, ¶ 33 at 7. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Rauch was
10 "affiliated" with the Center for Hospitality and Tourism, but admits it "does not know whether
11 Mr. Rauch was an employee of San Diego State University or an outside consultant." Id. ¶ 20
12 at 5. According to the FAC, Rauch has "actively advertised and promoted [his] involvement
13 in and preparation of the" 2004 study and has "generated contracts for further and additional
14 work." Id. ¶ 44, 8. Plaintiff asserts Mr. Rauch engaged in the wrongful acts in both his
15 individual and official capacity. Id. ¶ 20 at 5.

16 Defendants allege the FAC demonstrates the real defendant is the Trustees, not Rauch,
17 as Plaintiff makes no distinction between Rauch's and the Trustees's acts and Plaintiff fails to
18 allege when, where or how Rauch engaged in a wrongful act in his individual capacity. They
19 further argue Defendant Rauch acted purely in his official capacity, and therefore is protected
20 from suit by the Eleventh Amendment. Specifically, Defendants argue that the actions
21 undertaken by Defendant Rauch were during the course of his employment, for the benefit of
22 his employer, the state university, and therefore, the suit against Defendant Rauch is in his
23 official capacity and is disallowed. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Rauch is subject to suit
24 because Plaintiff is suing Defendant Rauch in his individual capacity, as well as his official
25 capacity as demonstrated by the allegations he personally committed copyright infringement.

26 Based upon the FAC, which includes allegations that Rauch personally engaged in the
27 infringing behavior, the Court finds Plaintiff seeks relief from Rauch in his individual capacity
28 as well as official capacity. Accordingly, Rauch is not entitled to sovereign immunity from the

1 suit seeking relief against him in his individual capacity.

2 **B. State Law Claims**

3 Plaintiff asserts state law claims against Defendants pursuant to pendant or
4 supplemental jurisdiction. Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to claims brought against
5 a state in federal court under supplemental jurisdiction. See Raygor v. Regents of the
6 University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 541-41 (2002). Absent a waiver, Defendants are
7 entitled to immunity. Plaintiff fails to address this issue entirely, much less demonstrate a
8 waiver. Accordingly, the state law claims shall be dismissed against the Board of Trustees and
9 Defendant Rauch in his official capacity.

10 **II. Preemption of State Law Claims**

11 Defendants contend that Plaintiff's conversion, misappropriation, and unfair business
12 practices claims under state law are preempted by 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).

13 **A. Legal Standard**

14 Section 301(a) states that all legal rights stemming from copyright ownership are to be
15 governed by federal law. The Ninth Circuit employs a two-part test to determine whether a
16 claim is preempted by the Copyright Act. Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 448 F.3d
17 1134 (9th Cir. 2006); Kodadek v. MTV, 152 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998); Del Madera Properties
18 v. Rhodes and Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987) (overruled on other grounds). First,
19 preemption will only occur if the work in question falls within the scope of the Copyright Act
20 as set forth in 17 U.S.C. §§102, 103. Id. Second, the specific state law rights claimed must
21 be commensurate to rights that are protected by the Copyright Act in 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). Id.
22 "A 'right which is equivalent to copyright' is one which is infringed by the mere act of
23 reproduction, performance, distribution, or display." Balboa v. Trans Global, 218 Cal.App.3d
24 1327(1990)(Quoting 1 Nimmer on Copyright §1.01[b] at pages 1-12). If the state law contains
25 an element that is not present in the Copyright Act which materially changes the cause of
26 action, the state law claim will not be preempted. Balboa, 218 Cal.App.3d 1327.

27 **B. Analysis**

28 Plaintiff asserts claims for conversion, misappropriation, and unfair business practices

1 under California state law. With respect to Plaintiff's conversion claim, Plaintiff alleges it is
2 the owner of "tangible materials and intangible ideas" created by Plaintiff in connection with
3 the work on various economic impact studies and reports, including questionnaires and work
4 papers. FAC ¶ 58 at 10. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants "interfered with Plaintiff's right,
5 title, and interest" to the work and their acts constitute conversion. Id. ¶¶ 59, 60 at 10. With
6 respect to Plaintiff's misappropriation claim, Plaintiff alleges the tangible and intangible
7 property "not expressly incorporated into the economic impact reports prepared by Plaintiff
8 constitutes confidential, proprietary and trade secret information owned by Plaintiff" and
9 derives its value from not being known to the public. Id. ¶¶ 64, 65 at 11. Plaintiff alleges
10 Defendant used the confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets in preparing
11 the 2004 report, which constitutes misappropriation. Id. ¶¶ 67, 68 at 11. With respect to
12 Plaintiff's unfair business practices claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendants received unjust
13 enrichment through "unlawful and unfair business practices" pursuant to California Business
14 and Professions Code § 17200 *et. seq.* Complaint ¶ 77 - 81 at 12.

15 Defendant argues the conversion and misappropriation claims, as alleged, fall within the
16 purview of section 301, because they involve copyright subject matter. Specifically, Defendant
17 argues the claims seek relief for the ideas and concepts giving rise to the 2003 survey.
18 Defendants maintain Plaintiff's state law claims which seek relief for theft of ideas, text and
19 concepts giving rise to the 2003 survey fall within the scope of the Copyright Act and are
20 therefore preempted.

21 Because Defendant completely fails to address the unfair competition claim, the motion
22 is denied as to that claim.

23 Plaintiff maintains the preemption argument is based upon a misinterpretation of the
24 nature of its state claims and explains the misappropriation and conversion claims seek relief
25 for the theft of the methodologies for evaluation, the questionnaires developed by Plaintiff,
26 work papers generated while conducting the impact studies and "other intangible property and
27 ideas" not contained in the 2003 survey. This property, Plaintiff argues, is not just ideas in
28 the 2003 survey, but is separate and distinct property.

1 In reply, Defendants contend Plaintiff's assertions in the opposition attempt to bolster
2 the FAC are not relevant to a motion brought pursuant 12(b)(6) which tests the sufficiency
3 of the complaint, not the opposition. Defendants further argue, even with the additional
4 information, the state law claims are still preempted. Specifically, Defendants maintain the
5 tangible property, questionnaires and work papers are only valuable to the extent they contain
6 intellectual property subject to copyright law. Additionally, Defendants maintain the
7 intangible property and ideas fall under the Copyright Act.

8 **1. The Scope of the Copyright Act**

9 Upon review of the FAC, Plaintiff seeks relief for the theft of "tangible materials,"
10 including questionnaires and work papers" and "intangible ideas." FAC ¶ 58. The Court finds,
11 the tangible property which includes, questionnaires and work papers are "tangible works of
12 authorship" within the scope of the Copyright Act. See Del Madera Properties; see also 17
13 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102. Furthermore, the questionnaires and work papers were created in
14 connection with the copyrighted economic impact studies.

15 Although "ideas" are excluded from copyright protection, courts have determined
16 "ideas" contained in copyrighted material are within the scope of the Copyright Act, because
17 the scope of the Act is broader than the protection. See U.S. Ex. Rel. Berge v. Trustees of the
18 University of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding state claim for conversion for
19 "ideas" contained in copyrighted doctoral thesis is preempted by the Copyright Act); Entous
20 v. Viacom Intern., Inc., 151 F.Supp.2d 1150 (C.D.Cal. 2001); Selby v. New Line Cinema
21 Corp., 96 F.Supp.2d 1053 (C.D.Cal. 2001); Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F.Supp.2d
22 1115 (N.D.Cal. 2001). The Court finds the "intangible ideas" generated in connection with
23 the impact studies, as alleged in the complaint, are also within the scope of the Copyright Act.
24 Accordingly, the first prong of the test is met.

25 **2. Equivalent to Right Protected Under the Copyright Act**

26 Defendants fail to identify the elements of the claims they argue are preempted, and
27 do not articulate how or why Plaintiff's conversion, and misappropriation of trade secrets,
28 implicate rights that are equivalent to the rights federal copyright law protects. However, the

1 Court has reviewed the allegations and determines the claims are equivalent to the copyright
2 claim.

3 To state a claim for conversion under California law, a plaintiff must establish: (1) the
4 plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of certain property; (2) the defendant's conversion
5 of the property by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages. Oakdale
6 Village Group v. Fong, 43 Cal.App.4th 539, 543-44 (1996). While conversion is generally
7 immune from preemption because it involves tangible property, conversion actions seeking
8 only damages for reproduction of the property - not return of tangible property - are preempted
9 by the Copyright Act. Firoozye v. Earthlink Network, 153 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1130 (N.D.Cal.
10 2001). As alleged, Plaintiff is not seeking the return of property, but damages for its use. The
11 rights asserted in the conversion claim are the same as those protected by the Copyright Act.
12 As such, the second prong of the test is met and the conversion claim is preempted.

13 The tort of misappropriation under California law generally involves an issue of secrecy.
14 Plaintiff does allege Defendant used its confidential, proprietary trade secret information in
15 preparing its report. However, Plaintiff makes no allegation that Defendant disclosed the
16 confidential information. Accordingly, Plaintiff's misappropriation of trade secret claim lacks
17 the "extra element" of 'disclosure' of a secret in contravention of a specific duty to keep that
18 information confidential." Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1195 (C.D.Cal.
19 2001). As such, the misappropriation claim, as alleged, is preempted by the Copyright Act.

20 3. Amending the FAC

21 Plaintiff requests leave to amend its complaint to assert sufficient allegations supporting
22 its state law claims in the event the Court finds the claims are preempted. Defendant opposes
23 the request, arguing Plaintiff should not be given a third bite at the apple.

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1 The Court finds it appropriate to dismiss the preempted state law claims without
2 prejudice and to provide Plaintiff an opportunity to amend.

3 **CONCLUSION AND ORDER**

4 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:**

- 5 1. Defendant's motion to dismiss is **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN**
6 **PART**. It is **GRANTED** as to the claims against the Board of Trustees and
7 Defendant Rauch in his official capacity, and the conversion claim and
8 misappropriation claim. The motion is **DENIED** as to the claims against
9 Defendant Rauch in his individual capacity and the unfair competition claim.
- 10 2. The Board of Trustees is **DISMISSED with prejudice**.
- 11 3. All claims against Defendant Rauch in his official capacity are **DISMISSED**
12 **with prejudice**.
- 13 3. The conversion claim and the misappropriation claim against Defendant Rauch
14 in his individual capacity are **DISMISSED without prejudice**.
- 15 4. Plaintiff's request for leave to amend to cure the deficiencies of his state law
16 claims is **GRANTED**. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint **no later**
17 **than February 25, 2008**.

18
19 DATED: February 5, 2008

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21 _____
22 JOHN A. HOUSTON
23 United States District Judge
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CAROLYN REYES - Activity in Case 3:06-cv-01682-JAH-JMA Marketing Info v. Board of Trustees, et al Order on Motion to Dismiss

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