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VMG filed a copyright infringement suit against Madonna and others, alleging that the producer of the song “Vogue,” copied a 0.23-second segment of horns from an earlier song, known as “Love Break,” and used a modified version of that snippet when recording “Vogue.” The district court granted summary judgment to defendants and awarded them attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. 505. VMG appealed. The court agreed with the district court’s application of the longstanding legal rule that de minimus copying does not constitute infringement and that a general audience would not recognize the brief snippet in “Vogue” as originating from “Love Break.” The court rejected VMG’s argument that Congress eliminated the de minimis exception to claims alleging infringement of a sound recording. The court recognized that the Sixth Circuit held to the contrary in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, but found Bridgeport’s reasoning unpersuasive. The court held that the de minimus exception applies to infringement actions concerning copyrighted sound recordings, as it applies to all other copyright infringement actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants. In regard to the attorney’s fees, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion. A claim premised on a legal theory adopted by the only circuit court to have addressed the issue is, as a matter of law, objectively reasonable. The district court’s conclusion to the contrary constitutes legal error. View “VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone” on Justia Law

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VMG filed a copyright infringement suit against Madonna and others, alleging that the producer of the song “Vogue,” copied a 0.23-second segment of horns from an earlier song, known as “Love Break,” and used a modified version of that snippet when recording “Vogue.” The district court granted summary judgment to defendants and awarded them attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. 505. VMG appealed. The court agreed with the district court’s application of the longstanding legal rule that de minimus copying does not constitute infringement and that a general audience would not recognize the brief snippet in “Vogue” as originating from “Love Break.” The court rejected VMG’s argument that Congress eliminated the de minimis exception to claims alleging infringement of a sound recording. The court recognized that the Sixth Circuit held to the contrary in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, but found Bridgeport’s reasoning unpersuasive. The court held that the de minimus exception applies to infringement actions concerning copyrighted sound recordings, as it applies to all other copyright infringement actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants. In regard to the attorney’s fees, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion. A claim premised on a legal theory adopted by the only circuit court to have addressed the issue is, as a matter of law, objectively reasonable. The district court’s conclusion to the contrary constitutes legal error. View “VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone” on Justia Law

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VMG filed a copyright infringement suit against Madonna and others, alleging that the producer of the song “Vogue,” copied a 0.23-second segment of horns from an earlier song, known as “Love Break,” and used a modified version of that snippet when recording “Vogue.” The district court granted summary judgment to defendants and awarded them attorney’s fees under 17 U.S.C. 505. VMG appealed. The court agreed with the district court’s application of the longstanding legal rule that de minimus copying does not constitute infringement and that a general audience would not recognize the brief snippet in “Vogue” as originating from “Love Break.” The court rejected VMG’s argument that Congress eliminated the de minimis exception to claims alleging infringement of a sound recording. The court recognized that the Sixth Circuit held to the contrary in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, but found Bridgeport’s reasoning unpersuasive. The court held that the de minimus exception applies to infringement actions concerning copyrighted sound recordings, as it applies to all other copyright infringement actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants. In regard to the attorney’s fees, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion. A claim premised on a legal theory adopted by the only circuit court to have addressed the issue is, as a matter of law, objectively reasonable. The district court’s conclusion to the contrary constitutes legal error. View “VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone” on Justia Law

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This appeal arose from a copyright dispute between Adobe and defendant and his software company, SSI. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of both Adobe’s copyright and trademark claims. Although a copyright holder enjoys broad privileges protecting the exclusive right to distribute a work, the first sale doctrine serves as an important exception to that right. Under this doctrine, once a copy of a work is lawfully sold or transferred, the new owner has the right “to sell or otherwise dispose of” that copy without the copyright owner’s permission. In this case, the court concluded that the district court correctly held that Adobe established its registered copyrights in the disputed software and that defendant carried his burden of showing that he lawfully acquired genuine copies of Adobe’s software, but that Adobe failed to produce the purported license agreements or other evidence to document that it retained title to the software when the copies were first transferred. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s motion to strike and excluding evidence purporting to document the licenses. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly analyzed the trademark claim under the nominative fair use defense to a trademark infringement claim instead of under the unfair competition rubric. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View “Adobe Systems, Inc. v. Christenson” on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, alleging, inter alia, that defendants infringed “Bikram’s Copyrighted Works through substantial use of Bikram’s Copyrighted Works in and as part of Defendants’ offering of yoga classes.” The district court granted defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to the claim of copyright infringement of the “Sequence.” The parties settled all remaining claims. At issue on appeal was whether a sequence of twenty-six yoga poses and two breathing exercises developed by Bikram Choudhury and described in his 1979 book, Bikram’s Beginning Yoga Class, is entitled to copyright protection. The court concluded that the Sequence is an idea, process, or system designed to improve health. Copyright protects only the expression of this idea – the words and pictures used to describe the Sequence – and not the idea of the Sequence itself. Because the Sequence is an unprotectible idea, it is also ineligible for copyright protection as a “compilation” or “choreographic work.” Therefore, the court concluded that the district court properly granted partial summary judgment in favor of defendants because the Sequence is not a proper subject of copyright. The court affirmed the judgment. View “Bikram’s Yoga College v. Evolation Yoga” on Justia Law

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DC filed suit against defendant, producer of replicas of the Batmobile, alleging, among other things, causes of action for copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair competition arising from defendant’s manufacture and sale of the Batmobile replicas. The court concluded that the Batmobile, as it appears in the comic books, television series, and motion picture, is entitled to copyright protection. The court also concluded that the Batmobile character is the property of DC and that defendant infringed upon DC’s property rights when he produced unauthorized derivative works of the Batmobile as it appeared in the 1966 television show and the 1989 motion picture. Finally, the district court did not err when it ruled as a matter of law that defendant could not assert a laches defense to DC’s trademark infringement claim because defendant willfully infringed on DC’s trademarks. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for DC on the copyright and trademark infringement claims. View “DC Comics v. Towle” on Justia Law

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After receiving takedown notification, YouTube removed plaintiff’s video and sent her an email notifying her of the removal. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Universal under part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512(f), alleging that Universal misrepresented in the takedown notification that her video constituted an infringing use of a portion of a composition by the Artist known as Prince, which Universal insists was unauthorized by the law. The court held that the DMCA requires copyright holders to consider fair use before sending a takedown notification, and that failure to do so raises a triable issue as to whether the copyright holder formed a subjective good faith belief that the use was not authorized by law. The court held, contrary to the district court’s holding, that plaintiff may proceed under an actual knowledge theory in order to determine whether Universal knowingly misrepresented that it had formed a good faith belief that the video did not constitute fair use. The court held that the willful blindness doctrine may be used to determine whether a copyright holder “knowingly materially misrepresented[ed]” that it held a “good faith belief” the offending activity was not a fair use. In this case, plaintiff failed to provide evidence from which a juror could infer that Universal was aware of a high probability the video constituted fair use. Therefore, plaintiff may not proceed to trial on a willful blindness theory. The court also held that a plaintiff may seek recovery of nominal damages for an injury incurred as a result of a section 512(f) misrepresentation. In this case, plaintiff may seek recovery of nominal damages due to an unquantifiable harm suffered as a result of Universal’s actions. View “Lenz. Universal Music Corp.” on Justia Law

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The Foundation, the sole beneficiary of Ray Charles’ estate, filed suit to challenge his heirs’ purported termination of copyright grants that Charles conferred while he was alive. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the suit meets the threshold requirements of constitutional standing and ripeness, the argument that the Foundation may be a beneficial owner lends no support to its claim to standing; the Foundation is a real party in interest and has third-party standing; under the zone-of-interests test, the Foundation properly asserts its own claims where termination, if effective, would directly extinguish the Foundation’s right to receive prospective royalties from the current grant; and the Foundation is indeed a party whose injuries may have been proximately caused by violations of the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s judgment. View “The Ray Charles Found. v. Robinson” on Justia Law

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Minden, a stock photography company, filed an infringement suit under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 501(b), against Wiley, a textbook publisher, alleging that Wiley had substantially exceeded the scope of the licenses granted by Minden. Minden claimed that Wiley published far more copies of books containing the photographs at issue than permitted under the licenses. At issue was whether Minden, as a licensing agent, has statutory standing under the Copyright Act to bring an infringement suit based on alleged violations of the terms of its licenses to Wiley. The court held that Minden may bring an infringement action to remedy the unauthorized reproduction, distribution, and display of the photographs by those to whom it has granted licenses because agency agreements convey the rights to reproduce, distribute, and display the photographs to Minden via an “exclusive license” to grant licenses to third parties. Accordingly, the court held that Minden has standing to sue under the Act and reversed the judgment of the district court. View “Minden Pictures v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.” on Justia Law

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After plaintiff, an artist, prevailed on a contributory copyright infringement claim against ELW, a publisher of her artwork, the district court awarded her attorney fees under a fee-shifting provision contained in the parties’ publishing contract. Both parties appealed. Primarily at issue was whether the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., precluded enforcement of a contractual attorney fees provision in copyright-based litigation. The court concluded that the Copyright Act does not bar an award of attorney fees under the circumstances but held that the district court abused its discretion by categorically excluding the majority of plaintiff’s requested fees without adequate explanation. The court affirmed the district court’s pretrial order setting the issues for trial and affirm its orders denying plaintiff’s motions for sanctions and for leave to amend. The court concluded that, although the district court correctly determined that plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees, the district court abused its discretion by categorically excluding the majority of plaintiff’s requested fees and failing to provide an adequate explanation for its calculations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View “Ryan v. Editions Ltd. West” on Justia Law